Solution One: Set Funding So Pupils Meet Standards. Today's Method Outdated, Confusing and Inadequate
by Michael W. Kirst
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger has made it one of his Top 10 priorities to send more money to the classroom. California's education finance system is broken in every way, but the real story is the dismal achievement of kids in California.
That wouldn't do enough to improve California's schools. California's K-12 education finance system is broken in every way. It has no underlying rationale, is incredibly complex, fails to deliver an equal or adequate education to all children and is a nonsensical historical accretion. It is more centralized than almost any state system in the nation. Funneling more money to classrooms, through the same labyrinth, would not translate into a high-quality education for children.
What would?
Throwing out the current financing system and starting over.
Though there are many ways the system could be rebuilt, one approach would use the state's current, challenging academic standards as a framework. Each school would receive state funding sufficient for all its students to meet the academic standards.
Today's system, it is clear, is not working. California ranks 48th in the average number of students per teacher. And it is 50th in these areas: Guidance counselors for students (one for every 1,011 students), librarians for students (one for every 4,454 students), and students per computer (7.2 students for each computer).
A tortured history brought California to this sorry state, beginning in the 1970s, when local taxpayers lost their ability to override state decisions on how much to spend.
Until then, schools got their money primarily from local property taxes, which yielded enough money to put California schools' expenditures per pupilin the top 10 states. Expenditures among the more than 1,200 districts varied widely because tax rates and property values were so different.
If there was anything that Ronald Reagan stood for as governor in the early 1970s, it was property-tax relief. School districts around the state had been regularly raising the amount they took in from local property owners. So Reagan came up with a plan: Freeze the amount that each school district could take in per pupil for general spending. That became known as a district's revenue limit.
Reagan also had another reason for capping a district's revenue. He knew, based on lower birth rates, that enrollments would decline. So if districts kept collecting the same amount from taxpayers, they would have more and more to spend per student, as was happening in such states as New York and Pennsylvania.
On the other hand, Reagan's revenue limits, based on revenues permitted per pupil, forced state and local spending to decline each time a student was lost. And the predictable result was that California's national spending rank per pupil dropped sharply during the 1970-1980 enrollment decline. Today, despite spending $40 billion a year to educate students from kindergarten through high school, California ranks about 40th in the nation in per-pupil spending when adjusted for the cost of living.
Before long, revenue limits became a tool used to further twist the financing system. In 1971, the state Supreme Court had ruled in a landmark case, Serrano vs. Priest, that the state had to make general-purpose spending in all districts roughly equal, regardless of local property-tax receipts. General-purpose spending covers such things as teacher salaries, supplies and administrative costs.
By 1976, the state determined that the way to force that to happen would be to adjust districts' revenue limits. The state would increase the revenue limits for low-spending districts faster than for high-spending districts, so the gap between them would close over time.
However, before the state could equalize spending, Proposition 13 passed in 1978, drastically cutting local property taxes.
The state bailed out the local school districts from its large surplus and, in what marked a major turning point, assumed primary responsibility for funding schools. Today, for most districts, the slice of a property owner's property tax that is earmarked for education and paid to the county tax collector goes to Sacramento for distribution back to the state's 986 school districts. Then, the state steps in and makes up the balance up to the district's revenue limit. (About 3 percent of the state's pupils are in districts that keep all their property taxes, however, because of a 1952 provision. These so-called basic-aid districts are heavily concentrated in northern Santa Clara and southern San Mateo counties, and they are able to spend above the state per-pupil average.)
The result of Proposition 13 was even more state control of all school policy.
By 1983, the state court ruled that the equalization job was done: The state had ''equalized'' spending among enough of the state's school districts. After appeals of that ruling were turned down, the Serrano vs. Priest mandate to equalize spending became history.
The funding goal may have been met, but students were paying the price. State policy had pushed toward spending equality at a low level, and there had been no strong link to what students learned. Moreover, state assumption of most school funding meant that local schools became hostage to the state's volatile sales- and income-tax revenue streams. Even the 1995-2000 boom did not markedly raise the state's per-student spending rank compared to other states. Some districts have resorted to non-profit fundraising foundations and parcel taxes, but these can't raise large amounts in more than a handful of localities.
Voters recognized the schools' plight, and in 1988 passed Proposition 98, which earmarks a specific proportion (about 40 percent) of the state's general-fund revenues for K-12 schools and community colleges. But when state revenues decline, the school-aid guarantee declines as well. (For example, revenue limits fell in the 2002-2003 school year.)
Piled on top of the per-pupil revenue limits are more than 100 state special programs, called categorical-aid programs. A district that receives money under a certain "category" must spend it for that purpose, which might range from class-size reduction to advanced placement classes. Categorical aid represents about a third of the money Sacramento spends on schools.
Each categorical program created a constituency of beneficiaries that lobbies to preserve it. A disease of "hardening of the Categories" ensued that does not allow localities to shift state funds for local needs, but rather encourages hiring local administrators to apply for and oversee the earmarked state funds. Local school officials lack money to clean bathrooms, but have some categorical funds for adult education they cannot spend easily within the school year.
State categorical spending ballooned in the mid-1960s, and each decade politicians added another sedimentary layer to the mountain of categories. A series of articles earlier this year in the Sacramento Bee described categorical-aid programs gone awry, such as a $700 million annual desegregation program from the 1970s that is distributed according to a politically driven formula for only 68 school districts, in amounts that range from $1,778 to 51 cents per student.
Another example: Three hundred schools get state funds to help prevent dropouts, but it is not known if there is a measurable effect on dropout rates. And most high schools receive money for a 10th-grade counseling program, but the state does not know if any added counseling occurs.
Governors and legislators have squashed all attempts to overhaul this huge categorical system.
Put all this together, and today, only a handful of experts understand the intricacies of the current finance system.
One way to overhaul it would be to build financing around the state's academic standards. First, the state should guarantee an "adequate" level of funding to each school for all pupils without special needs to meet the state's academic standards. (The state would decide what the "adequate" amount of money is.) More funds would be provided for all special-needs students in the school to meet agreed-upon standards, and the final amount of money each school receives would be adjusted for the widely different costs of living across California.
That puts the emphasis where it belongs -- on what students learn -- and clarifies that the state's responsibility is to essentially guarantee an adequate education. Schools that do not meet state academic standards would face state intervention.
Indeed, most states that are considering revamping their school finance systems are using "adequacy" as the main framework. Those that have computed the price of achieving that goal have found it will cost more than they currently are spending and many of these states spend more than California does now.
Second, the state should reduce its categorical programs. Schools should be released from many of the restrictions in the massive education code as long as outcome standards are met.
Last, if voters in a community decide they want a school program that exceeds the state's academic standards, they should be able to approve increases to local income, sales and property taxes.
This system would lead to significant differences in spending per pupil among school districts, but every child in California would still be guaranteed a high-quality education.
Fixing School Funding
State should guarantee an "adequate' level of funding to each school for all pupils to meet the state's academic standards. Adjustments would be made for special-needs students and each county's cost of living. Schools that do not meet state academic standards would face state intervention.
Categorical programs should be cut back drastically, and schools should be exempted from many state rules as long as state academic standards are met. Voters in a community could raise taxes locally if they want school programs that exceed the state's academic standards.
Bottom Line: State would probably spend more than now, but all students would receive a good education.
Michael W. Kirst (mwk@stanford.edu) is professor of education at Stanford University and co-director of Policy Analysis for California Education, a privately funded think tank at Stanford and two other universities. He wrote this article for Perspective. |
Solution Two: Focus on School Incentives. Same Amount of Money Should Yield Better Results
by Eric A. Hanushek
California's education finance system is broken in every way, but the real story is the dismal achievement of kids in California.
What needs to be fixed is not just how schools are financed, but more important how the whole K-12 educational system is organized, and especially the incentives given to schools to do better.
The judgment that California's schools are not serving us well comes from considering outcomes, not spending.
Earlier this month, the National Assessment of Educational Progress provided another iteration of the unacceptably bad performance of California schools.
In reading, California students can thank students in the District of Columbia (fourth and eighth grades) and Louisiana, New Mexico and Mississippi (fourth grade) for keeping them from the bottom of the nation. In mathematics, a slightly larger set of states from the Old South provides that service.
This performance is not simply a reflection of the more difficult population that California has to educate. Regardless of race or economic status, California's fourth- and eighth-graders are near the bottom in reading and math.
Given the performance, one could even look at the state's school finance statistics from the other side. While the system is bad, it is at least inexpensive by national standards. A worse situation would be a bad system that is also expensive (think, for example, of the District of Columbia).
Of course, many argue that the low spending is what causes the bad performance. Indeed, this is part of what is behind Professor Kirst's push to spend enough to provide an ''adequate'' education. (Kirst's arguments appear in another article in this section.) Unfortunately, we have tried this spending approach again and again in California and elsewhere, without result. Even with the restraint of Proposition 13, California spending per pupil grew 50 percent after adjusting for inflation between 1980 and 2000.
There is no way to escape a simple fact: Spending by itself is not the answer. As a graphic example, Texas, with a similar mix of disadvantaged students, spends just a few hundred dollars more per student than California, and gets dramatically better performance in both math and reading, regardless of race or economic background.
No amount of money will yield results if the money is misspent. In education, misspending is buying unproven programs that do not work. It is overpaying bad teachers and underpaying good teachers. It is inappropriately constraining local districts in their choices of class size, curriculum and classroom materials. It is protecting administrative incompetence at all levels of the education system: state, district and school. All this happens in California.
We cannot spend our way out of the current problems.
The only hope is moving to a finance system that rewards what we want -- high student performance.
The system does not have to be complicated. Schools would receive a fixed amount per pupil from the state and would be rewarded or punished based on the achievement gains of their students.
If a school shows strong gains on state tests, the school or teachers would get bonuses. Looking at gains helps to determine if a school falling short of overall standards is doing a bad job or simply has less-prepared students.
The state would stop trying to tell each district exactly how to run its schools. What it would do is provide clear information about the level and gains of student performance in each district. It also would encourage parental choice -- through letting a student take the fixed amount allocated to him or her and spend it at another public school, at a charter school or even at a private school.
Sacramento also would provide a block grant to each district to cover the expected added costs of most special-needs students, language-deficient students and disadvantaged students, and would shoulder the extra burden for very-high-cost special-needs students and unusually high concentrations of disadvantaged children. It could also adjust funds up or down based on the local-market costs of hiring college-educated workers in different areas of the state.
How large should the funding be? Contrary to the suggestion by Professor Kirst, there is no scientific answer to what is ''adequate.'' This choice is a political decision that our elective representatives cannot and should not avoid. For simplicity's sake, the amount to start with could be the amount the state is now providing from its general fund per student.
What is different about this? The whole idea is to back away from a system that is highly regulated centrally, that promotes gaming based on perverse incentives and that does not encourage better student achievement. The new system would move in the direction of a focus on performance, while encouraging individual districts to develop innovative solutions.
No incentive system would work if the state continues to want to run local districts. By dealing with all school problems as we currently do, through increased regulations -- for example, ''tighter'' certification for teachers or blanket class-size policies -- the state removes the ability of local districts to make wise choices that use resources efficiently.
It surprises many that there is resistance to openness in funding, to providing clear information on student performance and to rewarding results.The resistance is easily seen by remembering that the state recently had large bonuses for school performance, only to have them dropped even before the current round of cuts related to budget problems. The simple fact is that many currently in the system do not want any focus on performance. The underlying philosophy here points toward the fundamental elements of the currently broken system and away from fixating just on budgetary allocations.
Focus on Success
At first, each school would receive the same amount per student that the state is now providing from its general fund, with flexibility on how it is spent. Extra money would be provided for special needs and disadvantaged students.
Reward achievement. If students at a school show strong gains on state tests, the school or teachers would get bonuses. Students could take the fixed amount allocated to them and spend it at another public school, at a charter school, or even at a private school.
Bottom Line: A system costing no more than today's could expect much better performance.
Eric A. Hanushek (hanushek@stanford.edu), an economist, is a member of the Koret Task Force on K-12 Education and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He wrote this article for Perspective. |